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Abstract 
A recent literature, dealing with special markets characterized by bilateral network externalities, is 
summarized and critically assessed. Specific features of these markets, in terms of pricing principles 
and externalities, are discussed first. Afterwards, several issues related to competition between 
platforms are considered. Finally, implications for competition policy and prospects for future 
research are briefly discussed. 
1 Introduction  
In two-sided markets, two (or more) parties interact on a platform, and the interaction is 
affected by special “indirect” network externalities. Furthermore, the distribution of prices 
faced by the two sides influences market participation and the overall volume of demand. 
The classic example is provided by credit card services. In deciding whether or not to 
subscribe to a specific card, consumers consider the number of merchants accepting it for 
payment, whereas merchants consider the number of customers wishing to use it. The 
value of joining a credit card “platform” depends on expectations about the opposite 
network size. Similar characteristics can be found in Yellow Pages directories (businesses, 
readers), publication software like Adobe Acrobat (authors, readers), Internet backbones 
and search engines (sites, surfers), shopping malls (shops, consumers), matching and 
employment agencies, auction houses, service vouchers networks, payment systems, some 
telecommunication systems, videogame consoles, scientific journals, and many others. If 
indirect network externalities are negative (Reisinger, 2004), the concept can be usefully 
applied to many media industries, in which the number of advertisers have a negative 
impact on readers/viewers/listeners, but of course advertisers like to get a large audience. 
A market is two-sided if platforms serve two groups of agents, such that the 
participation of at least one group raises the value of participating for the other group. 
Rochet and Tirole (2004) propose a more restrictive definition, where the term “two-sided” 
is only applied to cases in which prices faced by agents on each side (possibly zero or 
negative) have a direct influence on market participation for their side, so that the volume 
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of transactions does not merely depend on a comparison between total expected benefits 
and total transaction costs (a feature that has been defined as “failure of the Coase 
theorem”). 
There has been a recent surge of interest in two-sided markets, especially after the 
seminal papers by Armstrong (2004), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), and Rochet and Tirole 
(2003a). In the last couple of years, many research works have addressed diverse issues 
related to two-sided markets, and have considered variants of assumptions about timing, 
price instruments, externalities, etc. Some other papers have tried to put some order in this 
fast growing field, by providing general introduction, overview and discussion of “lessons” 
to be drawn (Evans, 2003), or general theoretical and definitional frameworks (Rochet and 
Tirole, 2004). However, a literature survey of the recent two-sided markets literature has 
not been offered to date. 
This paper aims at filling this gap. This is, admittedly, a rather difficult and 
“dangerous” task, for two reasons. First, most of the works have not been definitively 
published in scientific journals, and circulate as working papers or unpublished 
manuscripts. Therefore, there is an unavoidable risk of forgetting some, possibly 
significant, contribution. Second, and more important, there is still some lack of general 
consensus about what constitutes key characteristics of two-sided markets, and whether or 
not some markets should be counted as two-sided. Therefore, I am aware that, in 
presenting this young literature, I shall offer my personal point of view. Despite these 
potential shortcomings, however, I think that a “tentative” survey could be a useful tool for 
those interested in this subject, and that the body of literature has grown enough to start 
trying to review it. 
There is one puzzling aspect of the two-sided markets literature: once the concept of 
two-sidedness is understood, one can easily figure out how many two-sided markets there 
are in the real world. So, why is this literature so young? Why is it that economic theory 
seems to have devoted specific attention to these markets only recently? Is this literature 
teaching us something really new? The answer is that some two-sided markets have 
actually been studied for a long time, and some characteristics of two-sidedness have been 
noticed, but similarities between seemingly rather different businesses like, for example, 
consoles for videogames and matching agencies, were not highlighted previously. 
For example, Baxter (1983) realized a pioneering work on credit cards. Around the 
year 2000 a theoretical and empirical debate developed, triggered by a series of antitrust 
cases against the international credit card networks (Visa, MasterCard), in the United 
States, Europe and Australia. Contributions come from, among others, Gans and King 
(2003), Katz (2001), Rochet and Tirole (2002), Schmalensee (2002), Wright (2003a; 
2003b; and 2004). All these authors agree that credit card services have special 
characteristics, making conventional practices of antitrust policy partly not applicable to 
this industry. Only when these characteristics were noticed in other markets did a general 
theory of two-sided markets emerge.1 Since then, contributions in various fields, like 
competition in media industries (for example, Ferrando et al., 2004; Reisinger, 2004; and 
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Kaiser and Wright, 2004) or electronic intermediaries (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; and 
Jullien, 2004), have been formulated from a two-sided markets perspective.2 
In this paper, we first discuss some peculiar features of two-sided markets, which 
justify a distinct theoretical treatment. We then review the basic pricing principles under a 
number of alternative model specifications and objective functions. In the fourth section, 
the issue of competition in two-sided markets is considered, with special reference to 
platform competition, that is, between alternative interaction networks. The difficulties 
associated with the application of conventional guidelines for antitrust policy is briefly 
considered in the fifth section, based on Evans (2003) and Wright (2003c). Finally, some 
concluding remarks are provided. 
2 Peculiar characteristics of two-sided markets 
Network externalities are said to exist when consumer utility in a certain market depends 
(usually, in a positive way) on consumption of the same good or service by other agents.3 
Markets with network externalities have been widely analyzed, especially since the 
contributions by David (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1985), Farrell and Saloner (1985), and 
others. 
In a sense, two-sided markets are just markets characterized by a special type of 
network externality. This externality does not depend on consumption of agents in the 
same class (for example, consumers of the same product), but on consumption of different, 
but “compatible”, agents on an opposite market side. For example, in joining an 
intermediation service platform, a buyer will take into account the number of potential 
sellers using the same platform, in addition to the price she should pay. In other words, the 
opposite network size works as a sort of quality parameter in the platform adoption choice. 
Since the opposite network size is affected by the specific price applied to that side, the 
indirect utility for an agent in a two-sided market depends on both prices. 
However, if agents are allowed to make side-payments, the usage fee applied to each of 
them would play a rather minor role in the adoption choice. For example, if a buyer and a 
seller would be free to negotiate a transaction price, only the total surplus, net of all 
transaction costs of all sides, would matter. Any cost shift, for example, from the seller to 
the buyer, would then be passed through, and neutralized, for example through a 
corresponding price reduction.4 
According to the definition proposed by Rochet and Tirole (2004), such a market 
should not be termed “two-sided”. More precisely, they define a market as two-sided if, 
holding constant the total of prices faced by the two parties, any change in the price 
structure (or distribution) would affect participation levels and the number of interactions 
on the platform. This would occur if costs on any side cannot be completely passed 
through to the other side. Thus, it would become important to consider who pays what, in 
order to get “both sides on board”. 
                                                 
2 Some papers cited here deal with general theories. For instance, the market for electronic intermediaries is 
taken as an illustrative example. On the other hand, there are other industry specific papers that could be 
added, like the one on journals, or other media. 
3 The concept can be also applied to producers, in terms of lower costs. 
4 In the same vein, Gans and King (2003) identify precise conditions, making the interchange fee level 
neutral in the credit card industry. 
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From this point of view, the existence of indirect network externalities would not be 
sufficient to identify a two-sided market. On the other hand, Jullien (2004) argues that, by 
reducing the gains from interaction, the total price level affects participation. Increasing it 
would mean reducing participation of both sides of the market. In terms of externalities, it 
is then difficult to distinguish between one-sided or two-sided usage. 
The reasons why costs may not be passed through could be both exogenous 
(asymmetric information, transaction costs) and endogenous. Among the latter, especially 
important are price structures with fixed components, independent from the number of 
transactions (that is, subscription fees). Another important category includes special rules, 
contractually defined, devoted to limiting the possibility of discrimination among agents of 
the opposite market side, like no-discrimination (Chakravorti and Emmons, 2001) and 
honor-all-cards (Rochet and Tirole, 2003b) rules in payment systems. 
The nature of two-sided network externalities is determined by the characteristics of 
interaction processes. From the demand point of view, two main sources of externality can 
be singled out, depending on the interaction type: 
• Single interaction externality. A single matching is realized between two entities, 
acting on the two market sides. Network externalities exist whenever the 
matching quality improves when more alternatives become available. Examples 
of these markets can be found in real estate, dating and employment agencies.  
• Multiple interaction externality. Every agent gets a benefit, possibly potential, 
from each interaction. More interactions are possible if more partners are 
available. Markets of this kind can be found in telephone directories, Internet 
search engines and payment systems.  
The two categories are not mutually exclusive. Like in any market with differentiated 
products, the presence of more suppliers could imply a better choice for a specific good 
(thereby increasing the demanded quantity), as well as the possibility of buying more 
goods, from different varieties. 
The distinction between single and multiple interaction helps in determining the nature 
of the externality. In the single-interaction case, the number of agents in the opposite 
market side may be associated with decreasing returns on utility. In the multiple-
interaction case, returns could be (almost) constant. This has implications in terms of 
possible emergence of corner solutions in equilibrium, with one or few platforms 
dominating the market.5 More generally, concave or convex relationships may emerge if 
elements on the opposite side are regarded as substitutes or complements. 
In addition to inter-side externalities, there could be intra-side externalities, that is, 
among agents of the same group. An especially interesting case is the one, studied by 
Belleflamme and Toulemonde (2004), Anderson, Ellison and Fudenberg (2005), in which 
intra-side externalities are negative and inter-side externalities are positive. The obvious 
example is a normal market place, in which buyers like to find many potential sellers, but 
are also negatively affected by the presence of competitor buyers, and vice versa.6 
                                                 
5 This case is more likely when marginal returns do not decrease too strongly, which may easily occur with 
multiple interactions. 
6 In most cases, adding intra-side externalities does not fundamentally alter the picture provided by the 
theory of two-sided markets. For example, having one more buyer in a market may mean that suppliers are 
better off (and can be charged more) and buyers are worse off (and should be charged less). In many 
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If market equilibrium is defined as the outcome of a two stage game, where platforms 
set prices first, and agents on the two sides decide whether to join some platforms 
afterwards, there is a general problem of demand-side coordination of expectations. There 
could be, indeed, several equilibria for the same set of prices. For example, if negative fees 
are ruled out and (gross) utility on both sides is nil if no agent of the opposite side joins the 
platform, then a “pessimistic”, zero activity equilibrium is always possible. Most of the 
models in the two-sided literature just assume that agents successfully coordinate on 
positive levels of activity.7 
From the supply point of view, useful distinctions can be introduced, on the basis of the 
price, or non-price, instruments available for the platforms. Much of the literature has 
considered two classes of price instruments: membership and usage charges. Membership 
fees have been considered mainly in the context of market intermediation, and in all cases 
where transactions are not perfectly observed, or are costly to monitor. Usage fees have 
been considered mainly in association with credit cards and payment systems, for example 
in terms of merchant fees. 
The use of one or the other price instrument, however, is sometimes a purely 
conventional choice. From the point of view of an agent on one side, who has expectations 
about the number of interactions carried out in equilibrium, there is always some 
equivalence between the two types of price (as far as price changes can be compensated, to 
keep expected utility constant). 
The distinction between the two prices makes sense only if the choice of joining a 
platform is logically separated from the subsequent choice of making a certain interaction 
on the same platform. This is the approach taken, for example, by Caillaud and Jullien 
(2003), where the realization of a transaction on an intermediation platform is 
probabilistic.8 
Rochet and Tirole (2004) distinguish between “membership externality”, occurring 
when additional membership on one side benefit the opposite side members, and “usage 
externality”, occurring when an additional interaction benefits one partner agent. I think 
that this terminology is somehow misleading, because we are not talking about two 
different externalities, but actually about the same externality, assessed from two different 
points of view (which can be, nonetheless, usefully kept distinct). It is easier to think in 
terms of membership externality when membership fees are used, and in terms of usage 
externality when transaction fees are applied. However, the externality is only one, since it 
is eventually generated by the interaction of the two sides on the platform. 
3 Pricing 
The basic principles of pricing in a two-sided market can be illustrated by taking, as a 
reference, the case of a monopolistic, profit-maximizing platform. Suppose that this 
                                                                                                                                                    
circumstances, what really matters is the net effect on the platform profit, as well as the platform capability 
of internalizing network externalities (for example, when prices are set). 
7 Still, there can be multiple equilibria with positive activity (for example, Ambrus and Argenziano, 2004). 
8 In this setting, there can be side-payments between buyers and sellers, so that only the total transaction cost 
matter (not the price structure). Higher transaction prices reduce the probability of realization of a transaction 
on the platform. 
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platform serves two sides (a and b), on which there are na and nb agents, realizing a volume 
of interactions I(na,nb), which is increasing in both na and nb. 
We consider the existence of membership and usage fee for each side (Pi,pi), fixed per-
member costs Ci, and a variable transaction cost c. Then, the platform profit can be 
expressed as:  
 
(1)  Π = (P a −Ca )na + (P b −Cb )nb + (pa + pb −c)I(na,nb )  
 
Let us define the net utility obtainable by joining the platform, for agents on both sides, 
as: 
(2)  V i =U i(I) − piI − Pi  
 
If baseline utility, that is, the utility obtainable by not joining the platform, is 
normalized to zero, all agents for which Vi>0 will join. This determines the number of 
interactions on the platform9, as well as the implicit demand (for membership) in terms of 
either p or P. 
When transaction fees are not available, some authors, (for example, Armstrong, 2004) 
have demonstrated that, under standard assumptions, profit maximizing membership fees 
should be set at: 
 
(3)  Pi = Ci + c ∂I∂ni −
∂U j
∂I
∂I
∂ni n
j + µ i  
 where j is the opposite market side, and  µ i = −ni ∂P
i
∂ni  is the profit mark-up.
10  
To see how (3) can be derived, consider the number of agents ni as the profit 
maximizing “quantity” selected by the monopoly. There are two such quantities, 
corresponding to the two market sides. Suppose that quantity nj has already been optimally 
set. By adding an extra agent on side i, the utility of j-side agents would increase (bringing 
about an increase of demand beyond the optimal level). To neutralize this, membership 
fees on j should be set higher, to keep utility constant. In turn, this implies that the actual 
cost of serving an extra customer on side i is lower than its marginal cost. 
Notice that the only difference between a standard profit-maximizing price formula and 
(3) is the presence of the third term on the right hand side. This has the effect of lowering 
the relevant marginal cost in the Lerner equation, so that the actual opportunity cost of an 
extra member on side i is taken into account. Another equivalent interpretation is that the 
platform lowers the fee on one side to internalize the positive membership externality for 
the opposite side. 
Prices set according to (3) may well turn out to be negative, if the externality effect is 
sufficiently strong. If negative prices cannot be applied in a market, only one side will be 
                                                 
9 Notice that, in this setting, the number of interactions depends on the number of agents active on the two 
sides, not on prices (directly). This assumption is adopted in most of the papers in the two-sided markets 
literature, although it is not essential for the results. 
10 Also, the utility Uj refers to the marginal consumer on side j, indifferent between joining and not joining. 
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charged. This is an outcome often observed in many two-sided markets. As pointed out by 
Armstrong and Wright (2004), the impossibility of imposing negative fees on one side 
induces lower fees for the other side. This is an example of a general effect termed by 
Rochet and Tirole (2004) “topsy-turvy principle”: “a factor that is conducive to a high 
price on one side, to the extent that it raises the platform’s margin on that side, tends also 
to call for a low price on the other side as attracting members on that other side becomes 
more profitable”.  
Like in the case of vertical integration by firms, the act of internalizing market 
externalities is socially beneficial. Therefore, it is useful to keep a logical separation 
between the exercise of market power by the platform (socially harmful) and the objective 
of getting a balanced market. This second objective would be pursued even in the cases of 
constant profit, non-profit, or social welfare maximizing platforms.11 
It has been demonstrated (Jullien, 2004; and Bolt and Tieman, 2004b) that welfare 
maximizing prices do not generally cover the costs. This is because positive network 
externalities (both one-sided and two-sided) operate like economies of scale on the 
demand. Like in a natural monopoly, then, welfare maximization would be associated with 
negative profits. On the other hand, if profits cannot be negative, a sort of Ramsey pricing 
emerges (Jullien, 2004). 
To the extent that the platform operates like a sort of market regulator, it may try to 
influence the market performance with other, non-price instruments, for example by 
influencing the terms of trade of the two sides in the transactions (Wright, 2003a). 
Rochet and Tirole (2003a) study the case in which only transaction fees, rather than 
membership fees, are available12, and obtain a condition similar to (3):  
 
(4)  pi = c − p j + µ i  
 
which has a similar interpretation: every time one more interaction is carried out on the 
platform, this generates a marginal cost c, but it also allows imposing an interaction price 
pj on the other side. 
Combining the two conditions (4), it can be shown that the structure of prices in the 
two sub-markets is given by:  
 
(5)  
pa
pb
= ε
a
εb  
 
so, interestingly, prices applied to the two market sides are both directly proportional to the 
price elasticity (ε) of the corresponding demand. In other words, an increase in the 
elasticity in one sub-market increases the specific relative price. 
                                                 
11 There can still be a conflict between market power and social welfare in the presence of some market 
imperfections (Rochet and Tirole, 2002). For example, it has been argued (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2002) 
that the willingness to accept credit cards, for a merchant, is related to the possibility of stealing customers 
from some competitors. As such, this willingness (to pay for credit card services) should not be fully 
accounted for in the aggregate social welfare, as gains for some merchants would be associated with losses 
for some other merchants. 
12 Furthermore, they assume that I(na,nb ) = na nb . 
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Bolt and Tieman (2004a) notice that this holds true only if (4) identify an interior 
equilibrium, which means that concavity assumptions for the profit function should be met. 
They show that these assumptions may actually be violated in many circumstances, where 
a corner solution would emerge. In this way, they offer an alternative explanation for the 
fact that some platforms charge only one side. 
4 Competition in two-sided markets 
Various types of competition may affect two-sided markets. Inside competition occurs 
between subjects within the same platform, whereas outside competition occurs between 
two or more platforms. 
As far as inside competition is concerned, it should be noticed that belonging to a 
common platform does not rule out the emergence of internal competition. For example, 
payment card networks set compensation fees between bank members, but banks remain 
free to compete, having freedom in the choice of final prices for their services. A shopping 
mall is a two-sided market, attracting both customers and shops. Shops may still compete 
among themselves, though. In this case, an especially interesting question is how platform 
access can occur and how access prices are set (Nocke et al., 2004). 
Perhaps more challenging, and complex, is the case of platform competition: for 
example, between alternative payment systems, newspapers and TV channels, 
intermediation services, shopping malls. A key characteristic of platform competition is 
multidimensionality. Whereas, in a conventional market, customers may be attracted 
through lower prices and higher utility in one market, in a two-sided context it is possible 
to compete in one or the other side. For example, an intermediation agency can choose 
between reducing the commission fees charged to the sellers, or to the buyers. 
Competition may emerge “naturally”, or may be the result of active behavior by one 
market side. In Roson (2004), I consider a competitive auction for the procurement of 
platform services. In this setting, the auction should be designed in such a way that the 
price applied to the auctioning party is not the only element considered for the selection of 
the winning bid, given the need to ensure sufficient participation by the other side of the 
market. 
Schiff (2003) considers the possibility that open systems share access to one or both 
market sides, so that cooperation between platforms may coexist with competition. An 
example could be some real estate agencies, sharing directories of units for sale, or Internet 
backbones with peering interconnection agreements (Cremer, Rey and Tirole, 2000; Little 
and Wright, 2000; and Roson, 2003). Generalizing this case, one could easily conceive 
systems, in which access is sold to the other platforms at a price. This draws an interesting 
analogy between some two-sided markets and telecommunication networks, for which a 
wide literature on access pricing is available (for example, Laffont and Tirole, 2000). 
The introduction of competition in a market, for example through the establishment of 
a duopoly in a formerly monopolistic market, generates two distinct effects: a reduction of 
market power held by the incumbent platform(s), and a change in the price structure. In the 
previous section, we saw that a monopolistic platform balances the two market sides 
through an internalization of network externalities, and that this act is, in principle, in line 
with social welfare maximization. When competition is introduced, the competitive 
pressure has effects on both the aggregate price levels and the relative prices. Relative 
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prices may change because the competitive pressure may be stronger on one side. 
However, this translates into a “misalignment introduced by platform competition between 
the dominant platform’s objectives and social welfare maximization” (Hagiu, 2004b). 
Chakravorti and Roson (2004) compare the market equilibrium of a duopoly with the 
one of a cartel between differentiated platforms. They show that, when switching from the 
monopolistic cartel to the duopolistic competition, the effect of price reduction dominates 
the change on the price structure, with non-ambiguous positive effects on welfare, unless 
the market power of the cartel was already restricted by the nature of the platform (Rochet 
and Tirole, 2002), or by some other specific characteristics of the market.  
This result has a simple, intuitive explanation in terms of indirect network externalities: 
if a buyer (seller) fee is lowered, the buyer’s (seller’s) welfare will increase, but also the 
seller’s (buyer’s) utility will increase, as more buyers (sellers) will be active on the market. 
In this way, a platform would attract more agents of both sides, taking them away from the 
competing platform. As a consequence, pecuniary externalities operate in the usual, 
“prisoner’s dilemma” way, so that a competitive equilibrium will be characterized by 
lower prices on both sides. 
To draw the conclusion that competition is socially desirable in two-sided markets, 
however, the potential benefits of a single-platform standardization should be taken into 
account. A single platform (but not a cartel between incompatible platforms) may bring 
about higher market prices, but would also allow for a wider customer base on both market 
sides, with ambiguous effects on the agents’ utility (Schiff, 2003). If potentially alternative 
platforms provide differentiated services, a trade-off between economies of scale and 
differentiation emerges, as it is typical of monopolistic competition models. 
Single platform standardization may be the result of market competition, in which one 
platform “corners” the competitor. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) discuss a model with 
homogeneous agents, in which only one platform is active in equilibrium, and profits are 
zero. Profits can become positive if heterogeneity of some kind is introduced in the model 
but, nonetheless, there can be asymmetric equilibria even if platforms are symmetric. For 
example, Ambrus and Argenziano (2004) present a model in which, in equilibrium, one 
platform charges more to one side and less to the other one, whereas the competitor 
follows a reversed price strategy. 
4.1 Platform differentiation 
Two-sided platforms may provide services, which are perceived as different by customers. 
Traditionally, this aspect has been neglected in the credit card literature, where it is often 
assumed that a consumer could select, for payment, one credit card or another, provided 
that they are both accepted by merchants13 (Guthrie and Wright, 2003). On the contrary, 
the literature on other platforms (most notably on TV channels and newspapers) has 
specifically addressed the issue of service differentiation, sometimes endogenously 
determined.14 
                                                 
13 This is, clearly, a simplifying assumption. Credit cards do make advertisements to differentiate themselves, 
and their local degree of acceptance may differ. Furthermore, many credit card networks have fidelity 
programs. The result is that, even where consumers usually carry several cards, one card is prevalently used 
(Rysman, 2004). 
14 Think, for example, to a TV channel deciding about its type of programs: general entertainment, all sport, 
all news, not to mention the political orientation of its journalists. 
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Generally speaking, differentiation in two-sided markets does not produce effects 
qualitatively different from those illustrated, for conventional markets, by the Hotelling 
duopoly model (except for the standardization effect pointed out above). Without 
differentiation, a special type of a Bertrand price war emerges, bringing about complete 
dissipation of profits for the competing platforms. One fundamental difference from the 
base model, however, is that equilibrium prices are not generally aligned to marginal costs. 
This is because the outcome of the non-cooperative game is a situation in which consumer 
utility is maximized, under the constraint of non-negative profits. Since utility is also a 
function of the market volume on the other side, the problem of price balancing emerges 
even when profits are zero, so that one market side typically subsidizes the other one. 
4.2 Agent differentiation 
It was previously noticed that competitive equilibrium prices depend on the intensity of 
competition on the two market sides. In turn, this relates to the degree of agent 
differentiation on the two sides. Think, for example, of the case in which sellers are 
indifferent between services provided by two alternative intermediaries, whereas buyers 
are not. Leaving aside the issue, to be considered later, of the possible adoption of both 
platforms, it may be easily seen that intermediaries will fight more vigorously to conquer 
the seller side. 
This holds in general. Still, there are two ways to convince a seller: a low commission 
fee (even nil or negative), or a larger base of potential buyers. Introducing competition will 
bring about reductions in prices, but which market side will gain more? The side that will 
gain more is determined by two factors: (a) the relative degree of agent differentiation, and 
(b) the relative importance of network externalities (Chakravorti and Roson, 2004). 
When agents regard the competing platforms as offering different services, we may 
speak of horizontal differentiation. Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004) consider instead a case 
of vertical differentiation, in which agent utility, for example for the side a, is defined as: 
 
(6)  V a =θnb (Pb ,Pa ) − P a  
 
and the parameter θ takes different values among the agents, according to some 
distribution function. 
When agents on a two-sided platform are differentiated, the pricing policy can have an 
impact on utility through some selection mechanisms. Damiano and Li (2003) discuss a 
model in which the average quality of matches on the other side depends on platform 
pricing, like in the case of clubs, whose members are snobs, or dating agencies, whose 
clientele prefers to meet wealthy people. 
4.3 Multihoming 
The term multihoming, which originated in the technical jargon of Internet, is now 
universally used to define those situations in which some agents, in one or both sides of a 
two-sided market, adopt more than one platform, so that interactions may occur through a 
series of alternative channels. A shop manager multihomes when several credit cards are 
accepted for payment. A consumer multihomes when she owns several credit cards, among 
which to choose. Other multihoming examples are: advertisers using multiple media, 
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computers having installed more than one operating system, house sellers dealing with 
multiple real estate agents. 
Multihoming can be more easily observed when fixed costs of joining a platform are 
low or absent. For example, if per-transaction fee is the more significant cost element for 
merchants, more than one credit card will likely to be accepted for payment by the same 
business. On the contrary, if consumers pay only a fixed subscription fee, they will tend to 
use a single credit card, especially if credit cards offer comparable services and have 
similar degrees of acceptance among merchants. 
Adding multihoming makes the formulation and analysis of two-sided markets 
considerably more complex. To keep the analysis tractable, many authors just assume, on 
the basis of the specific characteristics of the markets at hand, which market side 
multihomes. Other authors adopt special assumptions15, which allow them to know in 
advance which side will eventually multihome in equilibrium.16 
A major difficulty in dealing with multihoming is given by the possibility of steering 
adoption choices by agents on the opposite side. As an example, consider the case of a 
merchant, who could accept for payment both a credit card and a debit card. It will not 
suffice to verify that there exist positive transaction benefits in both cases, to conclude that 
both cards will be accepted. If, say, transaction fees are significantly higher for the credit 
card, the merchant could just refuse to accept the credit card, in order to force the 
consumers to use her most preferred payment instrument. 
Clearly, the presence of multihoming on one market side influences the degree of 
competition. The competitive pressure will be stronger wherever a platform can get rid of 
its competitors, which occurs more easily where singlehoming prevails.17 As it has already 
been noticed, the instruments for the competitive fight are lower prices, or larger network 
volumes on the opposite market side. 
4.4 Endogenous adoption 
The choice of joining one or more platforms should be, in principle, endogenously 
determined within a model of platform competition. Unfortunately, introducing 
endogenous platform adoption can easily make the models overwhelmingly complex, and 
this explains why, as noted above, most authors prefer to take shortcuts, allowing to 
specify ex-ante the single/multihoming structure of the markets at hand. There are, 
however, a few papers which have recently addressed special cases of endogenous joining. 
Hermalin and Katz (2004) present a model in which there are no network externalities, 
platform services are horizontally differentiated for heterogeneous agents, and there are 
variable usage fees, but no membership fees. Reciprocal (both sides) multihoming is a 
possible equilibrium outcome, because agents are heterogeneous in terms of transaction 
benefits, which are platform-specific. Results critically depend on which side has the 
power of selecting the network under multihoming, that is, when alternative platforms are 
available. Agents on the selecting side will opt – whenever possible – for the platform 
providing highest net transaction benefits, but will join both networks (if net benefits are 
                                                 
15 For example, parameter homogeneity for one market side. 
16 This may not be an analytical “trick”. For example, in many settings it is quite natural that sellers view the 
platforms as homogenous, while buyers do not (view platforms as heterogeneous). See Armstrong and 
Wright (2004) for a discussion. 
17 Rochet and Tirole (2003b) notice that, when merchants can steer consumers, this “veto” right makes the 
competition more intense on their side. 
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non-negative) to prevent the case of facing a partner operating only on the other platform. 
Agents on the non-selecting side face a trade-off: by singlehoming, they could steer 
potential partners on their preferred network, but they could also lose some partners, who 
singlehome on their less preferred network. The amount of singlehoming partners, 
however, depends on market prices. If platforms apply zero transaction fees, all agents on 
the selecting side will join both platforms. But then, non-selecting agents will all 
singlehome on their preferred network, thereby determining which platform will be 
ultimately used!  
Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004) assume, on the contrary: network externalities 
(network volume is similar to quality in models with vertical differentiation), membership 
fees (no variable usage fees), heterogeneous agents in terms of sensitivity to network 
externalities. In their framework, there can be multiple equilibria in the platform 
competition game, but in only one equilibrium there are positive profits for all platforms. 
In this case, one side multihomes, whereas the other one singlehomes: there cannot be 
reciprocal multihoming in equilibrium. The intuition is simple: there is no scope to 
multihome when agents of the other side are already present in all platforms. To get 
reciprocal multihoming, it is essential that not all agents in the other side multihome, 
which may occur only when platforms are horizontally differentiated on both sides of the 
market. 
More generally, the possibility of choosing between  single and multihoming 
exacerbates the coordination problems faced by agents on both sides, thereby making the 
existence of multiple equilibria more likely (see, for example, Armstrong and Wright, 
2004). In addition to a coordination problem in terms of network size expectations, agents 
should coordinate in terms of adoption choices (they should successfully anticipate which 
sides will multihome, for example). 
In a recent work (Roson, 2005), I discuss a model of payment card competition with 
endogenous single/multihoming. The structure of the model is similar to that of Hermalin 
and Katz (2004), except for the presence of two-sided externalities, and the pre-assigned 
right of the consumers to choose the preferred card in the transactions (when possible). On 
the basis of prices selected by the competing platforms (membership and variable usage 
fees) consumers and merchants play a coordination game, as adoption choices on the two 
sides are interdependent. Not surprisingly, there can be multiple equilibria. 
In a specific market equilibrium with two competing platforms, the set of merchants is 
partitioned in four sub-sets: non-joiners, singlehomers on platform 1, singlehomers on 
platform 2, multihomers. Consumers are partitioned in a similar way, but multihomers are 
further distinguished between those who would select one network whenever possible, or 
the other one. If all subsets are not empty in equilibrium18, the competitor networks can use 
the four price instruments at hand (membership and usage fees for the two sides) to address 
four categories of customers: singlehoming consumers, multihoming consumers, 
singlehoming merchants, multihoming merchants. If one or more subsets are empty, some 
price instruments are redundant (under perfect foresight about the number of transactions 
in equilibrium), as it was pointed out in the previous section.  
Armstrong and Wright (2004) consider the possible existence of strategies specifically 
designed to infuence adoption choices: exclusive deals. They first derive conditions under 
which, in a certain two-sided market, one side multihomes and the other one singlehomes. 
They then consider the possibility that a platform proposes to the agents of the 
                                                 
18 This requires a sufficient degree of heterogeneity among agents and platforms. 
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multihoming side a “disounted” price, contingent on exclusivity (singlehoming on that 
platform). They demostrate that this would undermine the competitive equilibrium 
obtained in the base case, as exclusive contracts allow a special type of undercutting. A 
complete characterization of equilibria with exclusive deals, however, proves to be 
difficult: depending on model parameters and selection criteria, there can equilibria with 
both platforms active, or only one, and with or without exclusive contracts.  
4.5 Dynamics 
To create a two-sided market, a “chicken or egg” problem has to be solved (Caillaud and 
Jullien, 2003): to convince some buyers to adopt a certain intermediation platform, it is 
necessary to convince first some sellers, but to convince the sellers, there must be some 
buyers on the market. 
In most models, this problem is avoided by assuming the simultaneous arrival of agents 
on the two market sides, in a rational expectations equilibrium. However, there are 
circumstances in which one market side has to intervene before the other one. The most 
cited case is the one of videogame consoles which, to get customers, must appear on the 
market already equipped with a complete range of games and complementary applications. 
To get the complementary software developed, some strategies are typically followed, 
like the under-cost provision of development kits, and of other support material. A 
fundamental issue is the capability of credibly influencing the agents’ expectations about 
future network volumes. Especially important, in his context, is the possibility of self-
commitment towards future price strategies. The existence of credible commitment changes 
in a substantial way the dynamic game, increasing the number of available price strategies 
(Hagiu, 2004b). 
An interesting solution is also the integration, temporary or permanent, devoted to 
directly produce the complementary goods and services. For example, the handheld 
computers producer Palm has, at first, directly supplied most of the complementary 
software needed to get its hardware fully functional. When the product got a good market 
penetration, Palm has withdrawn from the software market, leaving the field to 
independent developers (Evans, 2003). 
In other contexts, market entry is sometimes obtained from contiguous segments. For 
example, debit cards were initially introduced for cash withdrawal. Only later, these cards 
started to be used as a payment instrument but, at that time, they were already sufficiently 
diffused among consumers, so that only one market side (the merchants) had to get on 
board. 
4.6 Asymmetric platform competition 
To retain analytical tractability, most models assume symmetry among competing 
platforms. Yet, departing from these assumptions can often shed light on some interesting 
issues. 
Chakravorti and Roson (2004) consider a “perturbation” of a symmetric equilibrium of 
platform competition. In line with the “topsy-turvy principle”, mentioned earlier, a factor 
conducive – say – to a price reduction on the side a for one platform will induce a price 
increase on the opposite side b. However, the competing platform will react to these price 
changes by increasing the price for side a, and decreasing it for side b: in terms of price 
structure, the two platforms move to opposite directions.  
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This is similar to what happens in an asymmetric Hotelling duopoly, where a cost 
disadvantage for one firm translates into a lower market price for that firm and a higher 
price for the competitor. Here, in addition, any price change on one side brings an opposite 
variation for the other side, by all platforms in the market (see equation 4). 
Fahri and Hagiu (2004) add that a cost reduction for one platform on one side may 
raise profits for the competing platform, even if platform services are substitutes on all 
sides. This is because a duopolistic equilibrium may entail cross-subsidization between the 
two market sides (price may be below cost on one side). Furthermore, the price structure 
reflects both the need to get all sides on board, and the relative intensity of competition. As 
mentioned above, if one platform lowers the price on one side, the competitor will also 
change its price structure, for example by lowering the price on one side and increasing it 
on the other side. The competitor’s profit may turn out to be higher, if the price rise takes 
place on the subsidized side. 
Hagiu (2004a), Economides and Katsamakas (2004), Katsamakas and Bakos (2003), 
analyze competition between platforms with different ownership. More precisely, they 
study the case of competition between a proprietary platform and a non-proprietary, open 
access platform. The typical example considers a proprietary operating system (Windows) 
and an open-source one (Linux). In so doing, these authors establish a link with another 
nascent literature: that on open-source software (Lerner and Tirole, 2001, 2002; and 
Mustonen, 2003). 
This case is especially interesting because, on one hand, a non-proprietary, non-profit 
platform by definition does not have market power, so it can only “charge” direct marginal 
costs but, on the other hand, it fails to internalize the two-sided externalities, since it 
cannot cross-subsidize one market side with the other one (as a proprietary platform can 
do).  
Hagiu (2004a) sets up a model in which there is free entry in the market for 
complementary software, within a monopolistic competition setting. He shows that “if 
applications are differentiated and consumers are interested in one application (the Salop 
framework), then a two-sided sponsored platform will choose a number of applications 
lower than that generated by a non-sponsored platform but higher than that chosen by a 
welfare maximizing social planner, so that a two-sided proprietary platform is preferable to 
a non-sponsored platform, as it reduces the inefficiency of excessive entry. However, the 
opposite result holds when applications are homogeneous and users have a taste for 
variety: the two-sided sponsored platform exacerbates the problem of insufficient entry, 
since it chooses a number of applications inferior to that generated by a non-sponsored 
platform, which is itself less than the socially optimal number.”  
5  Implications for competition policy 
In two-sided markets, the application of antitrust procedures must face special difficulties 
which, in some cases, may bring about erroneous conclusions. The common denominator 
of most erroneous applications of the antitrust methodology is the lack of understanding of 
the typical nature of two-sided markets, especially about the interdependence of agents’ 
decisions in the sub-markets. 
The most trivial error is considering a single sub-market in isolation. Given the need to 
have both parties involved (getting both sides on board), a price set above marginal or 
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average costs is not a symptom of market power, as well as a price below cost is not a 
symptom of predatory behavior, and the combination of the two above cannot be 
interpreted as a presence of cross subsidies (Wright, 2003c). Even under pure Bertrand 
competition prices are not, in general, aligned to costs, despite the fact that profits are 
completely dissipated. 
Another typical mistake is the erroneous interpretation of the nature of some 
instruments, like the interchange fee in credit card networks. Contrary to what was stated 
in some recent antitrust cases, the interchange fee is not a price that covers transaction 
costs, but it is rather an instrument used by payment networks to get the right balance of 
prices in the sub-markets. Any intervention devoted to bring this fee in line with need not 
increase welfare, and will not necessarily induce competing networks to change their price 
structure in a similar way. Finally, fostering network competition does not necessarily 
bring about a more efficient interchange fee. 
Because of this, tying practices (usually forbidden by antitrust legislation) may have a 
rather special interpretation in a two-sided setting. Rochet and Tirole (2003b) present a 
model in which competition takes place between two competitor platforms, offering 
identical services. However, one of the platforms also acts as a monopolist in a second 
two-sided market. By tying the products sold in the two markets, the multi-market platform 
can achieve a better price balance (from the platform, as well as from the social welfare 
point of view), since it becomes less vulnerable to competitive pressure. In addition, 
Jullien (2004) notices that tying can be a device to credibly commit about network size in a 
two-sided market equilibrium, which is based on agents’ expectations. 
Finally, the existence of a significant installed base on one side should not be 
interpreted as a barrier to entry in the opposite sub-market. For example, in the famous 
Microsoft antitrust case, it has been argued that the existence of a wide range of 
application programs available for Windows is an obstacle to entry of competitors in the 
market for operating systems. Still, the mere existence of network externalities is a natural, 
not pathological, condition in two-sided markets (Evans, 2003). 
6 Concluding remarks 
Two-sided externalities are pervasive and important phenomena in modern economies. 
Yet, a specific literature on two-sided markets has emerged only recently, largely as a spin-
off of the literature on credit cards and, to a lesser extent, of the literature on media 
industries and intermediation platforms. Not surprisingly, the two-sided markets literature 
appears well developed in those areas in which the analogy with the markets mentioned 
above fits well, whereas research is lagging behind in other areas, in which a more original 
approach may be necessary. 
Nash equilibrium in simultaneous games of fulfilled expectations is the dominant 
theoretical paradigm. On the other hand, dynamics is a much less studied subject, with a 
good growth potential. Cases in which expectations can be revised over time appear to be 
especially worth to explore, as well as dynamic platform competition. 
Another uncovered area is empirical research. The very few available studies address 
specific issues of specific two-sided markets. More general empirical research, 
complementing the fast-growing body of theoretical literature, is still missing. 
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